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Abstract 
A question that is central to current debates about the Europeanisation of private law is that of how to 
conceptualise the relationship between European law and national private law. And a key aspect of 
that question is the impact on national private law and institutions of the growing corpus of EU 
regulation of important service sectors of the economy. In that context, are national regulatory 
authorities, now increasingly networked in EU regulatory networks, an interface between the 
European and the local, or are they co-opted as arms of European regulatory law?  In that context, are 
their growing interventions in private law relationships a further distancing of law from the control of 
domestic democratic institutions? 
 
In this paper, I begin with the observation that the sidelining of traditional private law together with 
adjudication and courts, as its principal institutions, has been a longer-term process, resulting from 
transformations of society and its knowledge base and the inability of traditional institutions to cope 
with those transformations.  In the post-industrial society of networks, some prominent commentators 
have foreseen a role for the re-emergence of private law as the institution that mediates or translates 
various fragmented social rationalities. In this paper, I argue that private law has not risen to this task 
of orchestrating various stakeholders because, even if such a task of translation were possible, private 
law institutions are not well-adapted to perform it with traditional tools.  By reference to examples 
from the regulated network sectors, I argue that conceptions of European law as hierarchical 
“intrusions” into national space may be oversimplified. At the EU level we witness attempts to 
overcome the limitations of standard interventions through proceduralized mechanisms for joint 
learning: both between administrators at different levels and between administrators and private actors 
(both regulated entities and other social stakeholders). The advantage of EU-level interventions is that 
they are not as steeped in tradition and habitual patterns as national private or public law institutions, 
so they are more open to experimentation with heterodox approaches. The disadvantage is that EU 
interventions can self-consciously define their mandate as narrow or their objectives as limited. In 
such cases, those whose perspectives are excluded by the narrow mandate may, in the absence of other 
ways of redefining that mandate, seek redress through the national courts.  The local and generalist 
nature of national courts can be their advantage in providing a venue that amplifies the voice of small-
scale communities and their apparently small-scale problems. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Discussion of the Europeanization of private law has in recent times usually focused on the project of 
drafting a European Code1.  This tendency is understandable, since in most EU member states, the 
national codes have traditionally been seen as the principal source of national private law. As Micklitz 
has argued, this was the private law counterpart of the “constitutionalization” of the EU project and 
serves to shore up the Union’s “state-like” status.  Yet a “codification” perspective has a certain “back 
to the future” quality even in the more traditional state context.  This is even more so for the EU, given 
that it has already heavily intervened in various non-traditional aspects of private law, such as 
consumer protection, as part of the process of market-making and re-regulation.  Thus, the process of 
intrusion and substitution of local rules can be said to have commenced quite early, beginning with 
seminal EU cases, such as Cassis de Dijon. 
More recently, attention has been increasingly focused on the various (EU) regulatory regimes 
in sectors such as food safety, financial services, energy and transport, increasingly affecting the 
conduct of private actors and restructuring private relationships.  A mixture of competence limitations, 
subsidiary concerns and the inexistence of “traditional” institutions produces institutional innovation 
at the EU level, which incorporates member state actors.  Does this mean that a self-standing European 
functional law now governs many if not most key economic activities with little or no reference to 
national private law and courts? Once eager agents of European integration, by enthusiastically taking 
up the power afforded by the preliminary reference procedure, have European courts dealt themselves 
out of the adjudication game?  Are there good reasons for such a process of distancing and 
autonomization to take place? 
One common view from private lawyers in the member states might be that this distancing of 
European law and marginalisation of traditional institutions is driven by the highjacking of the 
functionalist logic of integration by European institutions, such as principally the Commission and the 
Parliament, aided and abetted by the ECJ.  But the trend away from private law adjudication of 
disputes had begun much earlier and independently of EU integration, as a combined result of 
transformations in the economy and society, as well as of an increasingly more encompassing 
definition of the public interest pursued by the state.  While EU integration, and the creation and re-
regulation of the common market have exacerbated that process, it bears emphasizing that the EU, 
even if this were at all feasible, does not have the capacity or resources to act as a formal hierarchy2.  
Instead, EU institutions must engage with (in the sense of “collaborate with” as opposed to “give 
orders to”) private actors, national administrations and even courts, to achieve their policy goals.   
The aim of the paper is both to identify the different dimensions and the reasons for which the 
European legal order may be becoming “self-sufficient”, situating these developments in on-going 
debates about European law and governance and exploring the possible residual role that might be 
played by national private law and courts in that context. Specifically, I am sceptical about whether 
private law can re-emerge as a mechanism for review and discipline over private self-regulatory 
systems and for translating and orchestrating various social rationalities. Yet there may be spaces and 
functions to which the local and general nature of national private law courts can provide them with an 
advantage so as to be synergistic with European regulatory private law (ERPL) in the EU multi-level 
order. 
 
Background – private law in the nation state and beyond 
National private law is usually seen to comprise contract and tort law as its main pillars, and in most 
Member States of the EU following the civil law tradition, these bodies of law have traditionally been 
                                                     
1 See the contribution by Micklitz in the working paper EUI LAW 2012/31. 
2 Simon, “The Architectures of Complexity”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, (1962) 106 (6), pp. 467-
482, at 468 (defining a formal hierarchy as “a complex system in which each of the subsystems is subordinated by an 
authority relation to the system it belongs to”). 
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realised in the form of a comprehensive codification of general rules.3 Schematising broadly, the 
principal features of private law rules were that they were general in scope and facilitative in function. 
Private (civil and common) law is general in scope because it does not typically differentiate between 
different fields or sectors of activity.  Instead, the rules are meant to apply generally (or 
“horizontally”) across all different kinds of activities and sectors.  Moreover, private law can be 
regarded as facilitative in the sense that it is meant to support the autonomy of private actors.  Thus, 
private law rules ordinarily did not mandate substantive outcomes, but instead aimed to facilitate 
private ordering, such as for example in economic and commercial affairs. Thus, we might say that 
contract law provides the background default rules for cooperation, while tort law supplies the default 
rules for managing the risk from interaction between private parties. 
Ladeur points out that the rules of private (as well as public law) were based on what he calls 
“social knowledge”, which together with “conventions and professional practices” was “enshrined in 
the public order at large or in social and technical experience”4.  Thus, from the institutional point of 
view, these rules could be applied by generalist judges (and even juries), who could easily access this 
generalised knowledge, rather than having to rely on some form of specialised or functional 
knowledge. Individual judges could resolve private law disputes through adjudicative means and 
without the aid of specialised knowledge or decisional machinery, both because of their substance, but 
also because of their “unicentric” nature5. Fuller describes as unicentric those disputes which are 
individualised, localised and self-contained.  In contrast, Fuller terms as “polycentric” those disputes 
that have broad and disparate ramifications and ripple effects on actors other than the parties to the 
dispute, which might be difficult to anticipate and resolve by ordinary private law remedies, such as 
simple injunctions or damages to make good the injured party. 
Based on the facilitative conception of private law, principles such as the individual 
“autonomy” of private individuals, or their “freedom”, or the “equality” implied by the horizontal 
application of the rules to all different actors in society are sometimes said to be “foundational tenets” 
of private law, buttressed by philosophical and moral considerations, separate and apart and quite 
irrespective of any functions those principles might serve6. Yet, one ought not to forget Dewey’s 
observation that such apparently foundational principles become salient at specific junctures as a 
rallying cry for those pursuing particular (functional) objectives (such as the redistribution of power or 
economic opportunity from some prior equilibrium)7. Thus, Wiaecker has argued that the vitality of 
codes depends “on the social and economic value-judgments which inform them”.  While they might 
appear abstract, the codes were “a result of an alliance between bourgeois society and nation-state”8.   
Whatever their source, the foundational tenets of private law, such as autonomy, its facilitative 
rather than mandatory nature, and the general horizontal applicability of rules, have come under 
various pressures over the course of the 20th century. A number of such related pressures have been 
identified in the literature. 
One such pressure was the rise of first the regulatory and even more significantly the welfare 
state, which had explicit redistributive objectives, coupled with a recognition that the general and 
facilitative nature of private law nonetheless systematically favoured certain groups, such as for 
                                                     
3 Much has been made of the distinction between the common law and the code legal orders, including the violence that a 
European code would do to the common law, e.g. Legrand, “Antivonbar”, Journal of Comparative Law (2006) 1(1): 13. 
But this argument may well be overstated from a practical point of view.  Even in the common law, private law is 
systematized in treatises which are not unlike codes and which often provide the first point of reference for practitioners 
and judges before any search of the case law. In fact, Ladeur argues that codifications can often be viewed as an ex post 
“stabilization” of emergent practice in any event.  Ladeur, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the 
Evolution of General Administrative Law, 2010, available at: http://works.bepress.com/karlheinz_ladeur/1  (“Emergence 
and Evolution”). 
4 Ladeur, Emergence and Evolution. 
5 Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review (1978) 92, pp. 353-409. 
6 Basedow, “Freedom of Contract in the European Union”, European Review of Private Law (2008) 16,  pp. 901-923, at 902. 
7 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Swallow, 1954). 
8 Wieacker, The History of Private Law in Europe (Clarendon, 1995), p. 365. 
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instance the “repeat players” in the legal system vis-à-vis the one-shot players9 or even the 
adjudicative institutions. The redistributive objectives were pursued through various instruments, one 
of which was a regulatory contract law with numerous mandatory provisions protecting various 
“weaker” parties and thereby restricting the freedom to contract10.  This process obviously introduces 
greater differentiation or fragmentation within private law, by selecting specific classes of actors 
(consumers, workers, tenants etc.) to whom special rules and protections apply. 
Even more profound differentiation results from the implementation of specialised regulatory 
regimes pursuing specific substantive outcomes, as a response to problems that might be different in 
different industries. Such regulatory regimes were often targeted at specific sectors of the economy. 
This is because the force of the ordoliberals’ preferred disciplining mechanism that undergirds the 
view of the economy and economic law as autonomous, namely competition, is considerably 
weakened. As Adolf Berle, the bard of the modern theory of the corporate form, recognised, writing in 
1954, “the supporters of capitalism have to recognize that the economic check of competition through 
the market has weakened and in some cases disappeared. Yet if that check is re-moved, the modern 
corporation becomes something very close to a centre of absolute economic and hence of political 
power”11. Thus, for example, the public service utilities in most European nations were treated as 
natural monopolies subject to ownership and/or strict regulation by the state.   
It was not just the increasing state involvement that diminished the role of private law, but also 
the capacity of courts, as the principal adjudicative institutions, to handle the problems thrown up as 
legal disputes. Ladeur describes a transition from a society of individuals to a “society of 
organisations”, whereby individual relationships to the state and the law are mediated via 
organisations that dominated in production settings, though not only those12.  These organisations are 
the “repeat players”, who enjoy an informational advantage both vis-à-vis their customers and the 
courts and can systematically use that advantage. In such a setting, the use by the adjudicative 
institutions of “experience as the common societal knowledge basis was no longer sufficient”. In other 
words, Ladeur identifies a fragmentation between the “continuity of the self-reproduction of general 
experience distributed over the whole of society, and … the advanced knowledge which is generated 
by the big organisations both in the economic and the broader sense (including political parties, unions 
etc.)”13. 
To be able to regulate comprehensively in an organization-dominated landscape, the state 
itself must pool expertise in bureaucratic structures mimicking the large organisations, to intervene 
through planning, organised decisions and rules that apply prospectively. Through such interventions, 
to take the public utilities as an example, the administration could seek to regulate prices charged to 
final customers. Such an approach could be used to achieve – or balance – both technical efficiency 
and distributional public policy objectives, although it requires the ability to access information from 
deep within the regulated organisations and to remain attentive to the possibility of capture and the 
risk of stifling dynamic change.  While this expansion of the role of the state made public law more 
important as a control mechanism in society, in effect (as Ladeur recognises) the emergence of an 
expertise-based administration led to an overall effective “reduction of judicial control” over 
substantive decision-making. This is largely for institutional reasons: courts and judges do not have 
institutional capabilities to access the knowledge generated either by organised firms or organised 
                                                     
9 Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, Law and Society Review 
(1974) 9(1), p. 95.  
10 The extent to which this regulatory turn in contract law actually had protective or redistributive effects may be subject to 
considerable doubt, given the sporadic and unpredictable ways in which individuals could access the courts, the ability of 
courts to balance individual considerations (of the case at hand) with unpredictable follow-on effects (on other similar 
cases, such as with mass-produced goods or widely available services) as well as the relative cost and length of court 
proceedings. 
11 Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Grace & Co. 1954). 
12 Ladeur, Emergence and Evolution. 
13 Ladeur, Emergence and Evolution. 
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bureaucracies to engage in substantive oversight or comprehensive planning14.  Given the 
intermediation of relationships through large organisations in all different spheres, disputes tend to 
become polycentric, according to Fuller’s taxonomy. Both private law and judicial institutions are thus 
under pressure in such an environment. Moreover, the emergence of sectoral regulatory agencies and 
regimes leads to a further fragmentation of the once cohesive source of law (whether common law or 
code) and a distancing of the traditional legal institutions (courts) from the substantive regulation of 
conduct. 
The important point to note from our perspective is that these processes largely preceded the 
onset of European integration and the resulting considerable expansion of European regulatory law. 
This, perhaps unremarkable, observation serves as an antidote to two common tendencies, or fallacies, 
in scholarship on the interaction between supranational and national law as identified by Ladeur.  One 
is the assumption that globalisation somehow “invades” a “stable domestic administrative or private 
legal system from outside”. This, in turn, leads to a second tendency to both over ascribe responsibility 
to supranational processes and to romanticise the efficacy and legitimacy of the national legal order 
and institutions. 
 
European Integration: going beyond the state 
It is in this landscape of a growing relative importance of the administration vis-à-vis private law and 
judicial institutions more generally, that European integration began to take shape “through law”, 
thereby influencing national legal orders.  It bears emphasis that since EU-level lawmaking is of 
limited competence, this imposes an additional constraint on the process and the resulting forms of the 
law.  Formally, the EU does not have competence over private law, and codes are sometimes 
sentimentally seen as a mark of nationhood and a reflection of domestic social norms and customs or 
culture (despite a considerable degree of similarity of principles across national codes and the fact that 
many jurisdictions used transnational (“imperial”) templates as a basis for codification). Moreover, in 
virtually every sphere of legal intervention, the EU faced an enforcement challenge, given the 
limitations of administrative enforcement institutions at EU level, the inexistence of EU primary 
courts and the relative unfamiliarity of EU law to individuals and legal practitioners in the member 
states. 
Given these limitations, the most commonly used basis for European legislation in the 
regulatory sphere was the integration or creation of the common market through the removal of 
restrictions on cross-border trade. Given the deregulatory tendencies at the national level produced by 
early cases such as Dassonville and Cassis, this produced an oft-cited need to reregulate at the EU 
level. As might be expected, the EU regulatory efforts initially mimicked the national formats of 
regulation that they were supplanting, such as through the introduction of horizontal regimes for 
consumer protection, including regulatory contract law15 type provisions, such as cooling off periods, 
cancelation rights and so on. 
The domain of public service utilities does not appear to be one where much activity by the 
EU might have been expected, particularly given the perception of their localised monopoly nature 
and the fact that they were heavily regulated nationally and expected to perform a variety of social 
functions. However, a number of authors have pointed out the “output” legitimacy that the EU derives 
from pushing through successful projects that ultimately benefit the citizens of the Member States16. 
The aim of using market-making powers to break open national monopolies to competition, to allow 
new entry and lower prices for consumers can be viewed through that lens.  However, the combination 
of limited competences and the use of market integration powers can produce a tendency to focus on a 
narrow mandate in designing and implementing EU regulatory intervention.  In particular, the focus 
                                                     
14 The administrative law discourse in this era focuses on the ideas of deference and controls on procedure, neither of which 
guarantees either the accountability or the efficacy of regulatory decision-making, conceptually or in actual practice. 
15 Braucher, “Contract versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law”, Washington and Lee Law Review 
(1990) 47(4), pp. 697-739. 
16 Kelemen, Eurolegalism:  The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the EU (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
(“Eurolegalism”). 
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would be on the opening up of domestic markets to competition or liberalisation of entry either at all 
levels of supply or through vertical disintegration. This does not mean that interventions would be 
light or limited, given that in many of these markets competitive structures essentially have to be 
created.  Nonetheless, the objectives pursued within a legal regime can provide another dimension of 
autonomy; a narrow mandate regime may tend towards self-sufficiency so as to achieve that mandate 
more effectively. 
Yet, the mere fact of privatising or liberalising and opening up these markets does not 
guarantee that the ultimate outcomes will be beneficial to either consumers or other social groups and 
that public policy goals will be met without regulatory intervention. There may well be intermediate 
periods during which regulatory intervention to protect consumers or to enable them to learn and to 
take advantage of more competitive structures (to make adequate price comparisons, to switch 
providers) would be necessary. Moreover, in the medium to long term there may also be unintended 
consequences or unpredictable shocks that impede the achievement of the objectives of the reforms or 
that may even require substantial re-regulation. 
In a number of contributions, Teubner has argued that there is an opening within the 
increasingly globalised environment for private law to re-emerge as an institution (in the broad sense) 
that plays a key role in the achievement of social order, including specifically in the newly privatised 
sectors. This, in his view, would “transform private law itself into the constitutional law of diverse 
private governance regimes, which will amount to its far-reaching fragmentation and hybridization”17. 
More specifically, Teubner has suggested that the combination of social or functional 
“differentiation” and processes of globalisation leads to the emergence of autonomous regimes of 
norm-production that are transnational and quite separate from the state and ordinary politics:   
The economy, not just the economy but other social sectors such as science, technology, the mass 
media, medicine, education or transport are, on their specific path to globalization, developing a 
massive requirement for norms that is met not by governmental and intergovernmental institutions 
but by themselves in direct action upon the law. Increasingly, global private regimes are producing 
substantive law without the state, without national legislation or international treaties.18 
Moreover, to be effective, according to Teubner, these private regimes build an institutional support 
frame, including “quasi-private bodies” for dispute resolution, often without prior infrastructure 
supplied by states: “autonomous global law is increasingly basing itself on its own resources”19. He 
views these regimes as relatively effective at self-organisation, despite the fact that they are largely 
spontaneous, thereby turning many of the hierarchical aspects of traditional law on their head. 
There are two important underlying ideas that lead to Teubner’s observations cited above.  
One is the recognition that the emergence of networked architectures in production and in economic 
and social relationships enables channels of communication that connect normative communities, 
whereby these are no longer mediated through the state or state institutions20 or other formal 
hierarchies. Ladeur notes that the emergence of a “society of networks” is a “reaction to a further rise 
in complexity of the knowledge base of society”, given “the importance of information as the principal 
resource of production” and the fact that technological knowledge “is no longer concentrated in stable 
expert communities, but is distributed in overlapping project-oriented ‘epistemic communities’ which 
combine general and specific knowledge production in hybrid forms of communication”.  
A second and related recognition is that this transformation in the “knowledge base of society” 
enhances the capacity of private actors, economic and social, to self-organise to solve common 
problems and thereby create normative communities.  Moreover they can and they do do so across 
                                                     
17 Teubner, “After Privatization: The Many Autonomies of Private Law”, Current Legal Problems (1998) 51, p. 393, at 394 
(“After Privatization”). 
18 Teubner, “Global Private Regimes:  Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors”, in Public 
Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ladeur, ed, Ashgate, 2004), p. 73 (“Global Private Regimes”). 
19 Teubner, Global Private Regimes, at 74. 
20 Eg, Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale University Press, 
2006). 
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state borders so that such communities can be sources of global normativity even in the absence of a 
world state or relevant international organizations or treaties. Since these are private “regimes” 
unmediated by the state, this form of self-organisation could provide the basis for a renaissance of an 
autonomy-based (and autonomy-protecting) private law21, thus far sidelined by the growing 
intervention by the state through hierarchical action and expertise-based agencies. 
Teubner envisages that private law will need to “undergo massive transformation”22 in the 
process of recapturing its role as a tool for facilitating self-organisation in the new society of networks. 
First, the law must recognise the interrelatedness of relationships in networked regimes, rather than 
treating them as a multiplicity of bilateral arrangements23. Second, he suggests that private law should 
facilitate the self-constitution of these regimes with the appropriate mixture of a “spontaneous” and an 
“organized” sector24, but also “develop criteria for their legal review”25.  Finally, and perhaps more 
controversially, in performing this role, law must maintain the autonomy of the various “spheres” to 
pursue their own “rationality”26, while at the same time maintaining the law’s own autonomy. While 
this does not mean law should completely ignore, or not seek to incorporate, the knowledge generated 
in such systems, nonetheless it must do so on its own terms and within the pursuit of its own 
rationality27. 
 
Private law and European institutions 
While not stated explicitly in the works cited, traditional (though reformed) private law could be the 
legal order that plays this facilitative function.  Teubner’s views have triggered a rich research 
programme into private regulatory regimes, examining the tools through which private entities self-
organise in regimes that regulate their interactions and the mechanisms through which they enforce 
such arrangements28.  
There are two variables that are either missing from or require further elaboration in the 
foregoing discussion.  One is the question of guarding the public interest, since private regulatory 
regimes can easily be subverted to the interests of some or all of the participants. Another aspect that 
requires further exploration is the role of supranational institutions, both administrative and legal, such 
as the EU, both vis-à-vis the private regimes and vis-à-vis the private law that constitutes and regulates 
them. 
Specifically, Teubner does not appear to envisage any explicit role for the institutions of the 
EU or European law in the process of facilitating the self-organisation of these trans-border networks 
of actors.  Presumably, based on the idea that regimes are capable of more or less spontaneous self-
organisation, at best any role of the EU institutions is unnecessary. At worst, it could be harmful since 
it might reintroduce (supranational) hierarchy, which might ensnare the spontaneous processes, 
rigidify them and instrumentalise them to its own purposes (or its own “rationality”). 
Yet, considering the appropriate role of EU institutions, it is worth observing that the logic of 
linking the capabilities of actors in network architectures has been recently manifested in the trend 
                                                     
21 There are similarities in this argument to the underlying tenor of the work of Lisa Bernstein, “Private Commercial Law in 
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions”, Michigan Law Review (2001) 99, 
pp. 1724-1790 and Robert Scott, “The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract”, Northwestern University Law Review 
(2000) 94, pp. 847-876. 
22 Teubner, After Privatization, at 394 
23 E.g. Teubner,  “Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks Beyond Contract and Organisation”, in  Networks. Legal 
Issues of Multilateral Cooperation (Amstutz/ Teubner, eds, Hart , 2009) (“Coincidentia Oppositorum”). 
24 See Teubner, Global Private Regimes, at 84-86 (“For law there accordingly arises a new role of institutionalizing a dual 
constitution in the various sectors.”); Teubner, After Privatisation, at 394 (“to transform private law itself into the 
constitutional law of diverse private governance regimes”). 
25 Teubner, Global Private Regimes, at 80. 
26 Teubner, After Privatisation, at 394 (“make private law responsive to a plurality of diverse 'private' autonomies in civil 
society”). 
27 Teubner, Coincidentia Oppositorum. 
28 E.g. Caffagi, “New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation”, Journal of Law and Society, (2011) 38, pp. 20-49. 
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towards the creation of European networks of regulatory bodies across a number of important 
regulated economic sectors29.  Perhaps an early example of this practice can be found in the European 
Competition Network (ECN), which was formalised as a network in 2004, though reflected practices 
that had developed previously. The ECN was set up as part of the Modernization process for 
competition enforcement, which decentralised enforcement responsibility for EU law to the authorities 
of the Member States. As Ottow has pointed out, this model or approach has been extended to other 
sectors, including financial services, insurance, communications, energy, consumer protection. The 
common design appears to be to link the member state authorities, as well as the Commission, in a 
common discursive and/or enforcement network, rather than to completely centralise supervision and 
enforcement through a classical hierarchical European agency30.   
There may well be legal competence as well as political constraints in going down the path of 
forming a European agency in various sectors. Whatever the reason for the choice, this approach 
towards building regulatory architectures has resulted in a range of hybrid or “mixed administration” 
forms whereby responsibilities are “shared to differing degrees between the European Commission, 
new European regulators and national regulatory authorities”31.  The European regulatory networks 
follow the logic of the networked linking of capabilities of actors across borders. In other words, one 
could argue that a regime is created which links the entities that seek to promote and protect the public 
interest in the broadest sense. 
Importantly, the national agencies that form the networks operate both on the domestic and the 
European planes; sometimes (as in the case of the ECN) they are charged with enforcing both EU and 
national law. Two crucial factors in understanding the potential functioning and the outcomes of these 
networked regulatory regimes in the EU are their “constitution” and their relationship with other 
stakeholders in the sectors that they regulate, including the regulated entities, customers in general and 
those with specific characteristics (vulnerable, disabled etc.), labour, groups affected by environmental 
pollution or organised to pursue environmental goals.  
 
Regulatory Network Constitutions: Formal and Informal 
By the constitution of the networks I mean the constituting document of the network, the way in which 
it defines the mandate of the specific network (and the policy or public interest they are meant to 
pursue) and the relationships between the network members, as well as the relationship with the 
European Commission and other EU or national institutions.  In considering these “constitutive” 
issues, attention needs to be paid of course not only to the constitutive document, but also the informal 
dynamics and practices that emerge and perhaps become stabilised within the agency networks.  
 
Within the network 
To begin with the relationship between the EU Commission and national agencies,  formally, none of 
the sectoral networks appear to follow a typical hierarchical model in which either the network or the 
Commission has the power to determine or to reverse the action of a national agency. Instead, they are 
discursive fora that aim to stimulate cooperation between agencies in their efforts to implement the 
law. 
Even within networks that have a degree of centralisation in the hands of the Commission, this 
discursive principle appears to be important.  For instance, in the ECN, the Commission can relieve 
national authorities of the responsibility for a particular case and take up the case itself (Art 11(6)). 
However, such a decision could require justification before the Advisory Committee on 
Anticompetitive Practices and Dominant Positions (Art 14(7)). Case allocation is an important 
                                                     
29 Ottow, “Europeanisation of the Supervision of Competitive Markets”, European Public Law, (2012) 18 (1), pp. 191-221 
(“Europeanisation”). 
30 Even where a European agency is created, such as EFSA (the European Food Safety Agency), the design involves a 
networked Advisory Forum, involving the national agencies in the relevant field. Vos, “Responding to Catastrophe:  
Towards a New Architecture for EU Food Safety Regulation”, in Experimentalist Governance in the European Union:  
Towards a New Architecture (Sabel/Zeitlin, eds, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 159-160. 
31 Ottow, Europeanisation. 
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determinant of the network dynamics in an enforcement network such as the ECN as well as in setting 
policy direction. On the issue of allocation, the determination is based on a flexible standard of the 
authority best placed to decide a case, which despite its flexibility has not led to considerable disputes 
or turf battles. 
Within the ECN, members “are subject to an obligation to offer persuasive justifications for 
their actions and positions” to other network members; “further deliberation, not hierarchical action 
provides the only dispute resolution mechanism”32. However, given the privileged role of the 
Commission both historically and within the ECN, the informal internal dynamics may tell a different 
story. 
In the ECN Regulation, a requirement is imposed on national actors (agencies or courts) to not 
take decisions contrary to or conflicting with a decision of the Commission (Art 16).  Again, to the 
extent this is meant to prevent the imposition of conflicting injunctions on undertakings in specific 
circumstances, it makes sense. Beyond that, however, it simply invites the ordinary tool of 
distinguishing: in other words, offering a persuasive justification for the course pursued which also 
offers an explanation of any apparent departures from prior practice33. 
Apart from formal rules for interaction within the regulatory networks, another key 
consideration is the informal dynamics in the actual operation of the networks, both when deciding 
cases and formulating policy or filling out the details of legislation in general terms. We might call this 
the “informal” constitution: are the networks and their members delegates of the Commission aiming 
to propagate a monolithic view? Or are they being used to stimulate and encourage divergent 
approaches, so as to promote collective learning from pursuing different reasonable courses? 
Informal dynamics are important because of the dominant position of the Commission in some 
regulatory settings due to its past functions or due to its relative capacity, but also due to predilections 
for mimicry and copying, the public tendency for maintaining surface-level consensus34. Such 
dynamics cannot always be captured by looking at the formal rules of engagement of networked 
regulators (for instance, if employment with the Commission is perceived as prestigious, national 
officials may be of the view that their prospects of joining the Commission staff would be promoted 
by manifesting agreement). 
On the one hand, pursuing a monolithic vision enhances the likelihood of achieving it, but 
greatly increases the resulting damage if the original vision was wrong or incomplete. On the other 
hand, as Steinmo has argued, variation in the characteristics of actors and their settings in the various 
member states would be likely to lead them to choose from different menus of policy responses35.  
However, to the extent that there are general pressures for conformity, such an outcome may require a 
demonstrated commitment to allowing diversity by the actors present. Moreover, such an approach 
may be inconsistent with having a narrow mandate regime: there may be one best way to pursue a 
single objective, if it is being pursued without regard to the constraints imposed by other policy goals 
or by interaction with neighbouring regimes and systems36.   
 
Relationship with EU courts 
In two important respects, decision-making within the regulated sectors, both of a regulatory (rule-
making) nature and where it impacts and restructures a horizontal relationship between private parties, 
has been significantly isolated from court review even at the EU level.   
                                                     
32 Svetiev, “Networked Competition Governance in the EU:  Delegation, Decentralisation, or Experimentalist Architecture, in 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union:  Towards a New Architecture (Sabel/Zeitlin, eds, Oxford University 
Press 2010), at p.112. 
33 This is at least how some national courts have described the relationship.  Svetiev, supra n. 32, p. 113-114 (n. 21). 
34 Goffman, The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life (Anchor Books, 1959), p. 9. 
35 Steinmo, The Evolution of Modern States:  Sweden, Japan and the United States (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
36 Steinmo argues that one of the sources of variability is the fact that different sub-systems are affected differently by 
globalizing forces, which in turn means that they respond differently and in turn affect (or transform?) sub-systems with 
which they interact differently. 
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First, as already alluded to, the constitutive arrangements for the various regulatory networks 
ordinarily do not appear to envisage disputes between network members being referred to judicial 
review by the EU courts. On the contrary, these networks to some extent embody the principle of peer 
review, even if it is sometimes imperfectly implemented.  
Second, even where regulatory decision-making impacts or seriously restructures private party 
relationships, the tendency away from court review can be observed through a preference for non-
adversarial resolution of disputes.  One notable aspect of enforcement practice by the Commission in 
the exercise of its powers under the new Competition Regulation has been its use of commitment 
decisions under Art. 937.  Following the Commission’s expression of concerns with respect to the 
competitive impact of conduct, this provision allows the parties to restructure their own economic 
relationship so as to address or attenuate those concerns in an administrative conversation with the 
Commission.  In a 2006 case, one undertaking (DeBeers) provided a commitment to the Commission 
to cease purchases from another undertaking (ALROSA) pursuant to a 2001 contract and a preceding 
purchasing relationship dating from 195938.  ALROSA, which was essentially faced with a breach of 
the 2001 contract, the termination of a long-term purchasing relationship and the need to build an 
alternative effective distribution system sought judicial review of the commitment decisions from the 
EU courts. Emphasising the “voluntary” nature of this type of resolution, whereby the party proposed 
the commitment to the Commission, the ECJ has opted for minimal judicial review of this increasingly 
common type of resolution mode. The Court, in refusing to take up the invitation to exercise judicial 
review in such a case, declines to take on an important private law function to essentially decide 
whether it was appropriate for DeBeers to breach its purchase contract to address the Commission’s 
concerns, subject to a three year “transitional period … necessary [for ALROSA] to build an efficient 
distribution system”. 
One of the areas in which the Commission has used this flexible power to affect private 
relationships and reshape markets is in the utility sectors. Specifically, it has used the Art. 9 procedure 
on a number of occasions to intervene in the energy sector.  In one case, through a negotiated Art. 9 
procedure, it obtained commitments from E.ON, a key player in the electricity generation and 
wholesale market in Germany, to divest itself of about one fifth of its generating capacity39. This 
approach has left the Commission open to the charge that it is pursuing wider policy objectives, such 
as liberalization of the energy market, through the latitude allowed in the competition mechanisms, 
particularly in light of the “German government’s opposition towards the 3rd energy liberalization 
package” and in particular of “ownership unbundling”40.  The Commission used a similar procedure 
with respect to the unbundling of RWE’s gas distribution network41.  No doubt, the ECJ would have 
been aware of the Commission’s extensive use of the Art. 9 procedure to basically restructure essential 
utility markets at the time of its decision in Al Rosa, yet it did not claim a power of review for the EU 
courts of such decisions, even in a complaint from concerned third parties (rather than the party 
offering the commitments itself). 
 
 
                                                     
37 Schweitzer, “Commitment decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The developing EC practice and case law”, in 
European Competition Law Annual 2008: Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law (Ehlermann/Marquis, eds, Hart 
2009), pp. 547-580; Georgiev (2007) “Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in 
EU Law”, Utah Law Review (2007) 4: p. 971;  Svetiev, “Beyond Law versus Economics: A Learning Platform for EU 
Competition Policy“, 2011. mimeo. 
38 See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/90&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=fr 
39 Sadowska, Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far?, EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2011/34, p. 9 
(”Energy Liberalization”). 
40 Sadowska, Energy Liberalization, at 10. 
41 Hellström et al “Remedies in European Antitrust Law”, Antitrust Law Journal (2009) 76, p. 43.  According to Sadowska, 
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Defining the mandate  
The question of how the mandate of EU regulatory networks and actors is defined is quite an 
important issue when considering the relationship between European regulation and national private 
law and institutions. EU regulation has often been justified formally and based substantively on the 
criterion of creating the internal market. Even competition law enforcement was largely subservient to 
the internal market dimension from its very outset and has continued to be so for much of its history in 
the EU. Thus, not only have EU regulatory regimes favoured competition, but in fact they have 
favoured one specific type of competition, that is cross-border competition. This, in turn, means 
focusing on liberalisation (i.e. the removal of government restrictions on entry to an industry) or 
unbundling so as to introduce additional scope and entry points for foreign operators.   
A narrowing of the mandate can of course be one way in which an EU regulatory regime can 
become autonomous or “self-sufficient”, in the sense that it is charged with pursuing a focused limited 
objective: removing barriers to cross-border competition, while other objectives are pursued through 
other EU interventions (e.g. consumer protection) or national private law. At the same time, however, 
this may reduce the scope for learning from diversity42 and from the productive, even conflict-
generating interaction of different policy instruments and objectives43. Even more importantly, 
narrowing the mandate to focus regulatory activity on intermediate policy goals can sometimes 
obscure the relationship between regulatory interventions and the ultimate outcomes that are of 
interest presumably to policy-makers, economic actors and citizens. 
The case of the competition network discussed earlier is important in this context, both 
because it is a policy in which competence at the EU level is undisputed and in which the Commission 
has traditionally played a dominant role. Moreover, it is a policy area that cuts across all of the other 
sectoral regimes:  as part of the ECN, there are working groups around the various sectors, such as 
energy, telecommunications, financial services, transport, food and pharmaceuticals, and there is an 
emergent view that sectoral regulation should be undertaken on the basis of “antitrust principles”.  In 
at least one of the member states, the Netherlands, there is an on-going move to combine all of the 
sectoral regulators of the networked utilities (telecommunications, energy, transport) together with the 
competition authority into a single agency. This horizontal focus on competition may undermine the 
self-sufficiency of the different vertical regimes from each other. At the same time, however, it may 
underscore the view of the autonomy of the mandate (or objectives) being pursued through EU 
intervention. 
Focusing on the energy sector regulation regime, the objectives of the creation of the internal 
energy market are said to be “to deliver real choice for all consumers of the European Union, be they 
citizens or businesses, new business opportunities, and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve 
efficiency gains competitive prices, and higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of 
supply and sustainability”44. Thus, from the perspective of consumers, Lavrijssen, Bordei and Kooij 
distinguish three principal interests: “affordable energy prices achieved by effective competition; 
sustainable development of energy production, transport, and consumption and security of supply”45.  
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is a “connection between the 
Commission and the NRAs” and aims to promote “cooperation between national regulatory 
authorities, within a formalized context”46.  Yet ACER’s tasks and powers “have the potential of 
promoting and/or affecting the level of investments in cross-border energy infrastructure, the 
promotion of cross-border trade and competition on the wholesale markets”47.  In other words, they 
                                                     
42 Sabel/Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU”, European 
Law Journal (2008) 14(3), pp. 271-327. 
43 Azoulai, “The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy:  The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for its 
Realization“, Common Market Law Review (2008) 45, pp. 1335-1356 (“ECJ and Social Market Economy”) (with 
reference to the ECJ’s decisions in Viking/Laval). 
44 Lavrijssen/Bordei/Kooij, “The Role of ACER: A consumer perspective”, 2012, mimeo, p. 1 (“ACER”). 
45 Lavrijssen et al, ACER, at 1. 
46 Lavrijssen et al, ACER, at 2. 
47 Lavrijssen et al, ACER, at 6. 
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are more imminently connected to the intermediate goal of the completion of an integrated market, and 
their effect on the promotion and protection of the identified interests of final consumers is more 
“indirect”48.  Wholesale competition may or may not lead to affordable final prices, depending on both 
cost changes and the competitive structures in retail markets. Investments in cross-border 
infrastructure may improve reliability of supply while increasing reliance on current fuel sources (e.g. 
gas), while investments in renewable generating sources may promote sustainability, environmental 
goals and reliability of supply.   
 
Relationships with other stakeholders in the regulatory process: an entry point for 
private law? 
Apart from the constitution and the relationships within networked regulatory regimes and other 
governmental or EU actors, the process of elaborating and enforcing EU rules also involves receiving 
and appropriating input from various stakeholders in the regulatory setting, each potentially holding a 
different perspective on the regulatory problem. Thus, in describing the role of ACER, Lavrijssen et al 
note that in the process of regulation, supervision and creation of industry codes ACER must work 
closely with “the new European transmission bodies; the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) and the European Network Transmission System Operators for 
Gas (ENTSOG)”, which are the cooperation platforms at EU level for transmission system operators49, 
as well as consulting “other relevant stakeholders”. But of course, the multiplicity of rationalities of 
various social groups or movements can also be manifested in different ways, such as Lindahl’s 
example of the “occupation of the Brent Spar oil storage and tanker loading buoy by Green Peace 
activists, and the associated consumer boycott of Shell service stations”50. 
Therefore, the second key issue to consider is how to integrate these various perspectives in 
formulating and protecting the public interest in general. 
In elaborating the law’s role in structuring the “relationship of the subsystems to each other”51, 
Teubner has argued for private law to become “responsive to a plurality of diverse ‘private’ 
autonomies in civil society”52. The “social spheres of autonomy” are spontaneous and self-regulated 
collectives, which interact with each other and precisely this mutual interaction constrains each 
regime’s pursuit of its own rationality.   
[T]he main attention of global law would then have to be directed towards underpinning the 
duality of social autonomy in the subsystems, i.e. a mutual control dynamic of spontaneous sector 
and organized sector…53 
In some way, this appears to be an attempt to mimic the ordoliberal disciplining mechanism of arms-
length competition in a world where arms-length relationships are no longer possible, either because 
of the size of the organizations involved or because of the need to cooperate. By maintaining their 
autonomy both from the economy and from institutionalised politics, the separate social spheres can 
exercise a private constraint on economic actors in the newly privatised public services: 
Here, in the resistance of social practices to their new economic regime is the source of all kinds of 
new quasi-political conflicts which now take place within the ‘private’ spheres. A good indicator 
for this change is the growing intensity of political fights between regulatory agencies, consumer 
groups, regulated companies and their shareholders which we are experiencing today…54 
                                                     
48 Lavrijssen et al, ACER, at 8. 
49 Lavrijssen at al, ACER, at 3 
50 Lindahl, “A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries”, Modern Law Review (2010) 73(1), pp. 30-
56, at 38 (“A-Legality”). 
51 Teubener, Global Private Regimes, at 84 
52 Teubner, After Privatization, at 394. 
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Teubner views such conflicts as being reflected, at least in part, in private litigation and he foresees an 
active role of private law in the resolution of these emergent conflicts in the newly privatized settings. 
But to be able to perform this task successfully, in his view, both private law doctrines and procedures 
may need to change: 
For the future of private law it is crucial that not just its doctrinal-conceptual structures are 
prepared for such conflicts. Also different litigation procedures, among other rules of standing for 
groups, collective representation, multilateralization of the adversary two-party process, and 
elements of public interest litigation, would need to be introduced to make private law responsive 
to the new conflictuality caused by privatization itself.55 
However, in managing or mediating such conflict, according to Teubner, private law too must 
maintain its autonomy both at a conceptual (doctrinal?) and procedural level, to be able to play this 
mediating role56. In particular, as a consequence of social fragmentation a “multitude of social sectors 
require a multitude of perspectives of self-description” and the resulting “multiplicity of social 
perspectives” needs to be “simultaneously reflected” or “translated” into the law57. He has elsewhere 
described this idea of “translation” into private law as “an autonomous legal reconstruction of 
normative social orientations” and a “legal mode of dealing with the collision between different social 
rationalities”58.  Lobel, drawing upon Teubner’s ideas, has spoken of the emergent role of law as one 
of “orchestration”59. 
 
Private law – orchestrator or concertmaster?  
In considering the role of private law in the process of European integration, it is worth noting that 
national private law and national courts do not appear to have emerged as principal actors in the 
process of either ensuring discipline or coordinating various functionally differentiated autonomous 
regimes. 
In addition, as part of the re-regulation of essential service provision in the EU, there may 
even be tendencies to reduce further the reliance on national private law courts even for purposes of 
dispute resolution in regulated sectors.  For instance, there is a push to implement alternative dispute 
resolution schemes, whereby all kinds of consumer-related disputes would be channelled through non-
court fora, including online platforms for dispute resolution. At national level, the independent sectoral 
regulators provide information on out-of-court dispute resolution procedures and sometimes provide 
the (sector-specific) dispute resolution services themselves60. While parties may well have a 
preference to not channel their disputes via the courts, it also appears that EU intervention facilitates, 
and even encourages, non-court venues for dispute resolution61. 
If this does indeed signal a wider trend away from the use of national courts as dispute-
resolution institutions, it also makes it less likely that private law will be the institution through which 
we will mediate the conflicts that ultimately define the public interest. Which in turn leads us to the 
question of why me might observe a trend away from relying on the courts.   
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The EU as a vertically integrated regime 
One possible answer might be that the interposition of the EU as a supranational hierarchy 
encouraging such a trend is denying this new role of private law. In other words, the EU is following 
the logic of vertical integration in the implementation of regulatory law, even where it wishes to rely 
on the potentially powerful horizontal direct effect between private parties as an enforcement tool62. If 
both lawmaking and law enforcement proceed through integrated (i.e. EU) institutions, it is more 
likely to be seamless and less likely to be impeded by local peculiarities or interests. 
The EU (and in particular the Commission) might find it easier to refashion national 
administrative agencies into “European” ones through close engagement in various European 
networks. If the national agencies “internalize” the EU mandate and perspective, they can become 
delegates of the Commission even in cases where the Commission does not engage in heavy 
oversight63.  National courts, by contrast, are a more challenging site for intervention for EU 
institutions, such as the Commission.  The sites for interaction with national court judiciaries are more 
limited.  This is to a large extent because of the principle of independence (autonomy) of judicial 
institutions, which forms part of the constitutional ideology of all the Member States of the EU. As a 
result, EU intervention in national courts must always proceed more cautiously. Despite the 
heterogeneity in the organization, make-up and even general quality of judicial institutions across the 
different MS, the EU formally treats the 27 legal orders as equal or at least equivalent. There may be 
softer approaches through programmes for “judicial education”, particularly in the more specialized 
areas of competition or sectoral regulation, but again the formal independence of judicial institutions 
may make it difficult to compare outcomes or to assess the efficacy of such education programmes. 
If intervention in national judicial institutions is difficult and if the establishment of a 
comprehensive system of European courts is impossible (for political reasons), the European legal 
order may be more effective if it becomes self-sufficient even at the level of enforcement and dispute 
resolution. Private parties can be given EU rights vis-à-vis other private actors and those rights can be 
enforced through European dispute resolution platforms. 
But this “vertical integration” perspective, namely that European regulatory objectives are 
likely to be impeded, both by less than seamless communication and by hold-up, if channelled through 
national private law courts, may in fact be overstated for a number of reasons. 
First, national courts were key protagonists in the emergence of EU law as we know it today. 
Most key cases establishing the foundational principles of EU law resulted from preliminary 
references from national courts. National courts fairly enthusiastically took up the invitation extended 
to them through the preliminary reference procedure64. This provision was a mere “invitation” to 
national judicatures, precisely because there is no judicial review or other procedure that can force 
national courts to make a reference and there are many escape routes through which to avoid such a 
reference65. Even after the apparently extensive expansion of the scope of EU law in sometimes quite 
strong and unexpected ECJ rulings, MS courts have continued to make preliminary references to the 
EU courts. 
Second, in a number of fields, the Commission has sought to include actions in private law 
courts as an aspect of enforcement of EU regulatory law in a number of areas, including consumer 
protection law and competition law. The Commission’s push for the expansion of rights of action in 
antitrust cases in private litigation before national courts was a reason for one of the recent major 
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political conflicts between itself and the MS governments66 
Yet in other fields, the regulatory purpose that is being pursued by EU intervention may well 
be frustrated if channelled through formalised court proceedings, because they aim to produce quick 
local (i.e. on the spot) problem solving. One example might be the rights granted to airline passengers 
vis-à-vis airlines in cases of delays and cancelation67. The aim of such a regulatory regime would be to 
offer speedy arrangements for alternative travel and for the intervening period, not to stimulate 
litigation.  Such a regulatory purpose might be relevant in a variety of consumer protection contexts. 
Finally, in recent times we have seen innovative ways in which the Commission has sought to 
establish a more deliberative, or collaborative, relationship with national courts in areas where there is 
significant EU law intervention. Thus, Article 15(1) of the Modernization Regulation for competition 
enforcement (1/2003) provides that “courts of the Member States may ask the Commission to transmit 
to them information … or its opinion on questions concerning the application of the Community 
competition rules.” In addition, under Article 15 (3) the Commission can act on its own initiative, 
“[w]here the coherent application of [Art 81 or 82] so requires,” to “submit written observations to 
courts of Member States” and also to make oral submissions with the permission of the local court. 
There is some evidence68 that national courts have understood this as a relationship not of 
subservience to the Commission, but as one of dialogue69. 
 
The limits of law’s capacity for translation 
To the extent that national private law and institutions are not re-emerging as key players in the new 
environment, this may not have anything to do with their being sidelined by EU regulatory law.  
Instead, in the world of functional and social differentiation as well as epistemic fragmentation, the 
traditional private (or public for that matter) law institutions may be limited by their own capacity to 
play the adaptive role of “orchestration”. Precisely the “autonomy” and the “rationality” of law and 
legal institutions may stand in the way of traditional private law playing such a role. The need for 
closure, the logic of procedural formality (as opposed to the proceduralisation of problem-solving), the 
translation and subdivision of problems presented into questions that can be answered in a binary way 
(e.g. yes/no), the limited set of judicial remedies; all of these might impede the law’s capacity to 
mediate social conflict and translate different social rationalities and public purposes. 
The story of courts incorporating the knowledge generated by other systems of knowledge is 
not necessarily a happy one.  In the context of the adoption by US courts of economic analysis in 
antitrust cases, Lopatka and Page have argued that courts rely only to a limited extent on expert 
assistance in order to acquire the economic knowledge necessary to resolve antitrust disputes 
presented to them70. Instead, under the logic of preserving the law’s autonomy or rationality, courts are 
said to develop “economic authority” through an unstructured method of “pragmatically examining the 
scholarly literature in the context of existing case law and adopting the most persuasive and plausible 
accounts” available at the time of decision71. Lopatka and Page explain that this process of selection is 
influenced by “intuitions”, “social visions”, and “ideologies”72 of the judiciary, as well as legal 
process considerations about the institutional capacity of courts to process highly fact-specific expert 
testimony73. The expert knowledge that courts have to incorporate is itself partial and likely to change 
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over time. Yet following its own rationality (such as for example, the notion of the balance of proof 
for a proposition), the law ordinarily will seek a level of certainty and coherence that eludes 
knowledge communities, particularly in cases where the environment is unstable and rapidly changing.   
As a result, the translated “economic authority” considered by Lopatka and Page is recoded in 
legal-procedural categories of a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficiency or a summary 
judgment granted based on an assessment that the available evidence shows no substantial or material 
dispute. Such an approach forecloses “further inquiry to both develop new learning and to incorporate 
it into decision-making”74. 
While one might object that the foregoing discussion is based on evidence from the US, 
arguably it is quite salient in the present context for a number of reasons.  First, in the US tradition 
there has been a much greater openness towards reliance on courts for the resolution of social 
problems (including in private disputes, such as the antitrust disputes on which the above observations 
are based). Moreover, there has also been a relatively high level of trust in the integrity and capacity of 
courts, at least at the US federal level. Second, US law and judicial doctrine is said to be relatively 
open to the incorporation of “extra-legal” knowledge, and nowhere has this been more the case than 
with respect to economic knowledge in antitrust cases over the past few decades. Thirdly, the above 
example is based on an attempt to incorporate only a single rationality into judicial decision-making, 
namely only upholding the value of competition, and this understood very narrowly as allocative 
efficiency (or short-run effects on consumer prices). In fact, US courts have emphatically disclaimed 
any possibility that in the context of antitrust cases judges might pursue other social or policy 
objectives apart from competition, precisely because these different dimensions of the public interest 
may appear ex ante incommensurate, and due to legitimacy concerns about the judiciary performing 
such substantive balancing. We might suspect that any attempt at translation into law of multiple (and 
incomplete) social rationalities would be all the more challenging. 
This might give us reason to doubt the capacity of private law and its traditional dispute 
resolution institutions to both guarantee the autonomy of various regimes in the pursuit of their 
rationality or mandate and at the same time “orchestrate” them in a way that balances their various 
contributions to the common or public interest. 
 
Conclusions and ways forward: Recapturing Private Law 
Teubner’s reemphasis on autonomy is an important shift and is part of a growing literature that 
entertains considerable doubt about traditional legal and administrative tools of law-making and law 
enforcement. Instead this literature advocates  alternative mechanisms that can provide a way of 
(re)accessing the deeply local knowledge of parties interdependent and interlinked in networked 
architectures, so that it can be used as an input into social and economic innovations.  Private 
governance regimes are certainly one way of accessing such knowledge and structuring collaboration 
among interdependent parties.  However, in light of the foregoing discussion about the limits of law, 
the question still remains of how to ensure that private networked regimes are not subverted entirely to 
the (short-run) private interests of (some or all of) their participants and what is the role, if any, for law 
and legal institutions? 
One response might be that even if national private law does not rise to the occasion, 
European courts might step in to play this role. Yet European judicial institutions are subject to similar 
constraints as national judiciaries and even other ones. Thus, European courts are even more distant 
from private actors and have to decide across many different contexts to be able to effectively elicit 
knowledge and translate or recode it into law that then has to also be applied across many different 
settings. The ECJ’s refusal to claim a more searching mandate of review for the negotiated resolution 
of competition complaints by the Commission may be treated as one manifestation of the European 
courts’ self-doubt in their capacity to perform such a function.   
Nonetheless, the ECJ’s decisions in cases such as Viking/Laval point to a more modest role 
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that European courts could play in seeking to include various dimensions of the public interest75, 
neither completely re-judicialising nor attempting to mediate or translate different social rationalities 
into law. The decision recognizes that the EU has “not only an economic, but also a social purpose”76 
and as such serves to emancipate social actors by giving them a seat at the table vis-à-vis economic 
operators who have benefited from European negative integration. As Azoulai has recognized, the 
“practical problem” relates to the “technical methods” for realizing this77. But the ECJ does not anoint 
itself as the actor that mediates between these different purposes across different contexts, turning the 
tables on the private parties: they cannot act to take drastic self-help or national legal remedies without 
taking into account the interests of the other parties involved78.  But this, in itself, may be insufficient 
– just as judicial institutions have a limited capacity for translation, they also have a limited capacity to 
engage in broad oversight and monitoring. Moreover, EU court interventions are sporadic. Both of 
these limitations lead to the problem of how to ensure that the possibilities created by the 
emancipation of different aspects of the public interests are being taken up and effectuated by private 
actors? 
A second response might be that the involvement of the administration would be sufficient to 
fulfil the function of guarding the broader interests of the public; after all, we saw earlier from the 
discussion of the ACER example that the administration often needs to collaborate with private actor 
networks to be able to perform its regulatory functions79. In addition, in the EU administrations are 
increasingly networked, they can rely on each other’s capabilities and they can also engage in learning 
from each other. They also increasingly exercise a review function over each other’s activities. 
One concern might be that there may be tendencies to re-establish the logic of hierarchy in the 
networked administration regimes. Rigid hierarchies are both an inadequate response to the 
environment and are easier to capture. They may in fact be impossible as a response80, but this does 
not exclude the possibility that mimicking the logic of hierarchy may take place in administrative 
networks. 
There is some reason to believe that this is not likely to be the case. As Lavrijssen et al point 
out, while the Commission can treat the network codes developed by ACER as recommendations only, 
in practice the Commission is likely to adopt them, given that their preparation requires “extended 
technical knowledge” unavailable to the Commission, based on deep consultation which the 
Commission would be unable to replicate81. Yet these are not designed (in the sense of fully-specified) 
regulatory systems and they cannot be, which often implies reliance on ad hoc provisional 
arrangements. By good fortune, this may result in an effective solution, but this is not necessarily 
going to always be the case82.   
A further concern about over-reliance upon the administration is that of capture. While a 
networked multi-level administration would be more difficult to capture, this is not impossible. But a 
subtler, and somewhat analogous problem has already been alluded to earlier. This is the problem of 
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the narrow definition of the mandate of administrative networked regimes83, or more specifically the 
interest or interests they seek to promote, including a focus on intermediate goals rather than the 
ultimate objectives of policy. Sometimes this can be the unintended consequence of excessive 
fragmentation, whereby certain policies are assigned to different regulatory instruments.   
Such an approach can have the effect of restricting the interests that fall within the purview of 
the regulation and the regulatory regime84: by defining the boundaries of intervention, they exclude a 
particular group or perspective from the decision-making processes. 
In such circumstances, the generalist jurisdiction, the breadth of the rules and principles, and 
the proximity of national private law institutions can serve a useful counterpoint function for national 
actors. They provide a place to which those unrepresented in the administrative “mandate” can turn in 
order to seek to redefine “in whose name” and for whose interests the regime acts85. The story of 
consumers turning to the local courts in Hamburg to seek relief from the ultimate effects of gas 
liberalization at the EU level may provide an example of such a use of national institutions, in a 
situation where they can neither impose their will upon, nor be ignored by, EU actors. 
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